Give  The People  What They Want? by Whittington, Keith E.
Chicago-Kent Law Review
Volume 81
Issue 3 A Symposium on The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review
Article 8
June 2006
Give "The People" What They Want?
Keith E. Whittington
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please
contact dginsberg@kentlaw.iit.edu.
Recommended Citation
Keith E. Whittington, Give "The People" What They Want?, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 911 (2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol81/iss3/8
GIVE "THE PEOPLE" WHAT THEY WANT?*
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON**
The literature on constitutionalism outside the courts has expanded
and diversified rapidly over the past several years. It has produced norma-
tive calls for taking the Constitution away from the courts,1 descriptive
studies of how the Constitution is interpreted outside of courts, 2 and in
many instances work that combines the normative and descriptive, as with
Larry Kramer's The People Themselves.3 It includes constitutional politics
"in the streets,"' 4 at the voting booths, 5 and among institutions. 6 Kramer's
vision of "popular constitutionalism" offers one valuable perspective on
how constitutional meaning is contested and remade in and through poli-
tics.
Kramer's book is a particularly rich addition to this literature. In addi-
tion to making a provocative challenge to "judicial supremacy" in the form
of "popular constitutionalism," it elegantly tells the story of the foundation
and growth of judicial review in the early republic. The normative argu-
ment that motivates and concludes the book has perhaps overshadowed the
historical account that takes up the bulk of its pages, 7 but his tale of the
transition from the customary constitutionalism of the British tradition to
the text-based constitutionalism of the American tradition can readily stand
on its own and is itself an important contribution to the study of American
constitutionalism.
The historical narrative is primarily concerned with the period from
the Revolution through the early Jacksonians. In this narrative, the Federal-
ist flirtation with judicial supremacy was routed by the Jeffersonians in
* With apologies to Ray Davies. THE KINKS, GIVE THE PEOPLE WHAT THEY WANT (Arista
1981).
** Visiting Professor of Law, University of Texas; Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
I. E.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
2. E.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION (1999).
3. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004).
4. Gary D. Rowe, Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401 (2005).
5. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. WHITTINGTON, supra note 2.
7. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The People's Court, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Oct. 24, 2004, at 32
(critical review of The People Themselves); L. A. Powe, Jr., Are "the People" Missing in Action (and
Should Anyone Care)?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855 (2005) (book review) (same); Larry Alexander & Law-
rence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1594 (2005) (book review) (same).
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1800.8 Some jurists, like Joseph Story, may have later accepted the view
that the "federal courts were principally, and finally, responsible for the law
of the Constitution," 9 but these were minor deviations. More significant,
however, was the nationalist response to threats of state nullification in the
late 1820s and early 1830s. Such constitutional disputes were enough to
convince politicians like Delaware Whig John Clayton that "we have no
other direct resource ... to save us from the horrors of anarchy, than the
Supreme Court of the United States."' 0 Kramer concludes, however, that
other prominent politicians had a "very different response to the same ex-
perience" and offered an alternative that staved off judicial supremacy. I"
By the 1840s, political leaders such as Martin Van Buren "rescued and
revitalized" popular constitutionalism through the vehicle of mass political
parties. Political parties "reasserted popular control over constitutional
development" and "marginalized the judiciary."'12
Kramer leaves it to a short chapter to carry the story up to the present.
Popular constitutionalism remained the "dominant" force, even if its "very
diffuseness and decentralization" left room for "advocates of judicial su-
premacy to continue nursing their claim."'13 Whenever those advocates
became too vocal, however, they were "pushed back" to the margins. 14 The
evidence here is thin, consisting primarily of the examples of Abraham
Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt to demonstrate the vitality of popular con-
stitutionalism. 15 By the 1980s, however, Kramer finds that liberals had
finally joined conservatives in their embrace of judicial supremacy, lulled
into abandoning popular constitutionalism by their approval of the sub-
stance of the activism of the Warren Court.16 Only in the late twentieth
century, within Kramer's lifetime and for the first time, did judicial su-
premacy become the dominant force in American constitutionalism. Not
too late, one might think, to pull such a new growth up by its roots. All that
is needed, Kramer implies, is for liberals to be reminded of their natural
heritage as popular constitutionalists and judicial supremacy can once again
be vanquished to the margins of American constitutional politics and dis-
course.
8. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 93-144.
9. Id. at 170.
10. Id. at 181 (quoting Speech of John M. Clayton (Mar. 4, 1830), in THE WEBSTER-HAYNE
DEBATE ON THE NATURE OF THE UNION 349, 363 (Herman Belz ed., 2000)).
11. Id. at 173.
12. Id. at 205.
13. Id. at 207.
14. Id.
15. Id. at209-18.
16. Id. at 222.
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I want to take issue here with Kramer's assertion that the establish-
ment of political parties banished judicial supremacy until the liberal chil-
dren of the Warren Court forgot their patrimony. Kramer's positive account
of the rise of judicial supremacy is, I believe, inaccurate, both in terms of
its political analysis and as a matter of history. Although political parties
can serve as the vehicle for a form of popular constitutionalism as Kramer
imagines, they have generally found it difficult-to do so. Instead, the politi-
cal parties are deeply implicated in the political dynamic that gives rise to
judicial supremacy in the United States. I develop that argument at length
elsewhere,17 and will only sketch a portion of it here.
In questioning Kramer's account of the marginalization of judicial su-
premacy, I do not question the importance of constitutionalism outside the
courts. Judicial supremacy tends to crowd out extrajudicial constitutional
interpretation, and the belief in judicial supremacy may encourage judges
and others to deprecate the constitutional views of non-judicial actors, per-
haps resulting in less deferential judicial review than might otherwise be
warranted. Even if judicial supremacy is accepted-in that non-judicial
actors are expected to give way in the face of judicial interpretations of the
Constitution and embrace the logic of those judicial interpretations-there
remains space for non-judicial actors to engage the Constitution prior to
and in the interstices of judicial interpretation. Even if non-judicial consti-
tutional interpretation is taken to be less authoritative than judicial constitu-
tional interpretation, it may nonetheless remain politically and historically
important. 18 Constitutionalism outside the courts may also be an important
influence on constitutionalism inside the courts, such that in pronouncing
their authoritative interpretations of the Constitution judges might take their
cues from non-judicial actors. 19 Perhaps more basically, the theory of judi-
cial supremacy is itself politically constructed by non-judicial as well as
judicial actors; it rests on the political foundations of the Constitution out-
side the courts. 20 Political actors may well use the courts as the instruments
17. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY (forthcoming
Jan. 2007).
18. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 2 (detailing how constitutional meaning has been con-
structed through political practice).
19. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining the Court's Federal-
ism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001) (relating the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions to its
supportive political environment); J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Rehnquist Court and
the Political Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233 (2004) (tracing the political background to
the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING ClvtL LIBERTIES (2004)
(examining how political developments are integrated into constitutional doctrine).
20. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 17.
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for advancing their constitutional understandings. The issue is simply when
and how judicial supremacy arose in the United States.
Mass political parties could function as the instruments for vindicating
preferred constitutional principles only under limited conditions. Those
conditions were in fact in place for the early Democratic Party that Martin
Van Buren helped found. What were the features of the early party system
that allowed it to serve this popular constitutionalist function? They were
several.21
First, the parties were organized around constitutional principles. The
Jacksonians created a coalition committed to rooting out the corruption of
the American system of protectionist tariffs, internal improvements and a
national bank, and reestablishing limitations on federal power. The Whigs
were formed in defense of the American System and in opposition to the
Jacksonian exertions on behalf of their substantive constitutional vision.
Party leaders on both sides reached out to new constituencies and inte-
grated additional interests to the extent that they did not threaten these ini-
tial core commitments. Although some members of each party coalition
may have some constitutional concerns in addition to these central com-
mitments, these were supplemental. On the core constitutional issues that
were priorities for party leaders, the party rank-and-file was unified and
reliable.
Second, politicians were creatures of the party and subject to party
discipline on these key issues. Unlike the first party period which organized
the political competition of the social elite, notables such as John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson, the second party period recruited men into politics
whose only claim to lead was that they were loyal servants of the party.
This not only democratized politics, allowing men such as Abraham Lin-
coln to rise to the presidency, but it also constrained politicians to faithfully
represent the party caucus.22 They had no personal authority by which they
could oppose the demands of party. Moreover, given party control of bal-
lots and campaign resources, individual legislators held their offices at the
pleasure of the party organization.
Third, parties controlled the government. Once the second party sys-
tem coalesced, the Democratic and Whig parties competed to secure a na-
tional electoral majority and bring the elected branches of the government
21. For readers who are interested, the information set forth on this topic throughout this article is
discussed generally in MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY AND
CALHOUN (1987).
22. See JAMES W. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT 123-69
(1979); see also JOEL H. SILBEY, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL NATION, 1838-1893 (1991) (describing
party politics in the nineteenth century).
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under the unified control of the party leadership. The legislative powers
that the constitutional founders had separated were brought back under
central direction by party organization and discipline. The Jacksonians did
not achieve the same degree of electoral success as the Jeffersonians-they
did not drive their partisan opponents into extinction-but they nonetheless
could and did expect to govern without compromise when they carried the
election.
Intraparty agreement on constitutional principles, robust party disci-
pline, and unified party government allowed the parties of the early Jack-
sonian system to serve as vehicles for popular constitutionalism and to
resist the blandishments and enticements of judicial supremacy. As long as
these conditions held, important constitutional questions could be resolved
by the people at the polls. In fact, they did resolve some questions. John
Marshall had attempted to settle the question of the scope of the powers of
the national government in McCulloch.23 It was Andrew Jackson and his
followers, however, who settled the issue, not through judicial supremacy
but through legislative action backed by the presidential veto.24 The limits
of federal power were authoritatively pronounced not in judicial opinions
but in party platforms and presidential messages.
Judicial supremacy had little to offer the early Jacksonians (or the Jef-
fersonians before them), but that situation was not stable.25 As the relation-
ship between the political parties and the salient constitutional issues of the
day changed, so did the political supports for judicial supremacy. Popular
constitutionalism as it played out in party politics can lead to partisan resis-
tance to claims of judicial supremacy, as it did during Jackson's presi-
dency. In other circumstances, however, it can converge with claims of
judicial supremacy.
Presidents and other party leaders face a basic leadership task with
two potentially conflicting goals. First, party leaders must seek to advance
23. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
24. See Mark A. Graber, The Jacksonian Makings of the Taney Court (Univ. Md. Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2005-63, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=842184; Keith
E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken: Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and Political Questions, 63 J.
POL. 365, 372-77 (2001); Gerard N. Magliocca, Veto! The Jacksonian Revolution in Constitutional
Law, 78 NEB. L. REV. 205 (1999).
25. For present purposes, I am ignoring the federalism-related rationales for judicial supremacy.
The desire of national officials to use the federal courts to control the states and limit interstate conflicts
was a particularly important basis for the political support for judicial supremacy in the early republic
and one that operated independently of the party-based dynamic sketched out here. See KRAMER, supra
note 3, at 185-89; WHITTINGTON, supra note 17; Keith E. Whittington, "Interpose Your Friendly
Hand": Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme Court, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 586-87 (2005); Jack N. Rakove, The Origins of Judicial Review: A Plea for
New Contexts, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1031, 1041-50 (1997).
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the central constitutional and policy commitments of their party. Second,
they must seek to keep their party coalition together and electorally suc-
cessful.26 Popular constitutionalism would suggest that presidents and party
leaders ought to have constitutional commitments that they seek to realize
in government practice (in addition to the various other policy commit-
ments that they obviously pursue). Presumably, however, few successful
politicians would be willing to pursue those commitments in ways that will
doom their own ability and that of their allies to hold political office or
otherwise severely damage their ability to exercise political power to
achieve those and other policy goals.27 When parties cease to be effective
vehicles, given those constraints, for realizing the substantive constitutional
commitments of popular constitutionalist presidents, then presidents will
have incentives to turn to other institutions in order to achieve those com-
mitments. Prominent among those alternatives is the Supreme Court. A
popular constitutionalist president may well promote judicial supremacy in
order to achieve the substantive constitutional commitments that he is
charged with pursuing.
Under conditions that are quite common in American politics, judicial
supremacy will become more attractive than political parties as a vehicle by
which to advance the substantive constitutional commitments of presidents
and party leaders. Mass political parties in the United States have histori-
cally faced pressure across all three of the conditions for party-based popu-
lar constitutionalism sketched out above.
First, parties become less attractive instruments for popular constitu-
tionalism when party members are no longer unified on key issues. Parties
can mobilize public opinion and legislative strength to resolve constitu-
tional controversies and establish favored constitutional understandings far
more effectively when the positions in those controversies cut along party
lines rather than across party lines. When constitutional issues divide rather
than unify co-partisans, then constitutional interpretation through political
action becomes muted, and contesting those constitutional issues within the
26. Political scientists often assume that major political parties only seek to win elections and that
policy positions are completely subordinate to that goal, and over time it is certainly true that the issue
positions of the major parties are fluid. See, e.g., ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY (1957) (describing vote maximizing theory of party behavior); Kaare Strom, A Behavioral
Theory of Competitive Political Parties, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 565 (1990) (outlining several theories of
party behavior). In a given historical moment, however, party leaders are likely to take their immediate
policy commitments as real and constraining.
27. There may be exceptions to this generalization. One thinks of John Tyler or Andrew Johnson
in the White House, but such examples are both statistically rare and circumstantially exceptional.
Moreover, however disastrous those presidencies seem in hindsight, it is possible that prospectively
even these presidents held out hopes that their actions would ultimately reap political rewards by recon-
figuring existing political coalitions.
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political arena threatens party unity. Judicial supremacy helps pull those
issues out of politics, allowing party leaders to focus on the issues that dis-
tinguish their partisan allies from their partisan foes.
Second, parties become less attractive and effective instruments for
popular constitutionalism when they can no longer count on the discipline
of their legislative members in the face of pressures to deviate. Rather than
staking out clear issue positions and acting on them, parties may fissure
when confronted with controversial constitutional issues, or worse, legisla-
tors may abandon party principles when tempted by the prospect of imme-
diate political gains. While early Jacksonian politicians had little ability to
deviate once the party had determined to stake out a position on key issues,
legislators since the late nineteenth century have developed independent
political resources that allow and encourage them to buck the party when
the constitutional doctrine of the party seems locally or immediately risky
to their personal hold on government office. 28 Internal dissidents can frus-
trate the realization of the constitutional vision for which a party putatively
stands, and as a consequence party leaders have incentives to look outside
of the electoral and legislative arenas to pursue that vision.
Third, parties become less attractive and useful instruments of popular
constitutionalism when they can no longer secure electoral victory and
organize the government on their terms. Martin Van Buren's own model of
a people's party to control and defeat the designs of scheming aristocrats
was grounded on the assumption that such a party, once organized, would
naturally dominate its rivals and successfully restore constitutional funda-
mentals.29 The two parties have proven more competitive than Van Buren
anticipated, however. Although party competitiveness is a good thing in
many ways, it is not particularly good for party adherence to foundational
principles. One danger to Van Buren's vision is that his party of constitu-
tional truth may lose an election, opening the door to constitutional error
28. On the separation of legislators from their parties, see, e.g., Nelson W. Polsby, The Institu-
tionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 144 (1968); Samuel Kemell,
Toward Understanding 19th Century Congressional Careers: Ambition, Competition, and Rotation, 21
AM. J. POL. Sci. 669 (1977); James C. Garand & Donald A. Gross, Changes in the Vote Margins for
Congressional Candidates: A Specification of Historical Trends, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 17 (1984);
John R. Alford & David W. Brady, Personal and Partisan Advantage in U.S. Congressional Elections,
1846-1990, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 141 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce 1. Oppenheimer, eds., 5th
ed., 1993); DAVID C. HUCKABEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LENGTH OF CONGRESSIONAL SERVICE:
FIRST THROUGH 107TH CONGRESSES (2002).
29. See Gerald Leonard, Party as a "Political Safeguard of Federalism ": Martin Van Buren and
the Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221 (2001). It is notable that Kramer
emphasizes the institutional question of who should interpret the Constitution when examining the
constitutional views of historical actors such as the early Jacksonians while giving little attention to the
substantive question of what the Constitution ineant for them.
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whether (perhaps temporarily) endorsed by the electorate or accidentally
thrust upon it. The Whigs ousted Van Buren himself from the White House
in 1840 during an economic downturn that was likely to doom any incum-
bent administration and with a "log cabin and hard cider" campaign de-
signed to obscure the ideological differences between the parties. 30 A
referendum on constitutional values it was not. Another danger, and one
that was facilitated by the rise of professional legislators who could sepa-
rate themselves from party fortunes, is the possibility in the American con-
stitutional system of divided government. Constitutional fidelity may be
difficult if veto points are controlled by members of the other party who
hold to constitutional heresies. Almost as problematic is the possible need
to integrate heterogeneous ideological elements into a grand partisan coali-
tion in order to cobble together an electoral majority. After the early Jack-
sonians, American party leaders have found it difficult to secure victory
without the necessity of compromising with smaller factions who corrupt
the party's constitutional message even as they provide needed congres-
sional seats or electoral votes. 31 Such divisions within and among the
elected branches of the federal government encourage party leaders to look
outside the political arena to advance their constitutional ideals.32
If political parties become less attractive and the courts become more
attractive as instruments for implementing the constitutional understand-
ings of presidents and party leaders under such conditions, how common
are they? It could be that they are quite common. Indeed, it is plausible that
for most of the period that Kramer skims over in chapter eight, from the
establishment of the second party system through the present, political
circumstances have favored judicial supremacy rather than party-based
popular constitutionalism.
It is party-based popular constitutionalism rather than judicial suprem-
acy that has been rare in American history. Political parties have occasion-
ally presented a united front on contested constitutional issues of the day
and achieved a definitive victory in the political arena. Most often, these
have been temporary achievements. Reconstructive leaders such as Thomas
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt have
mustered political majorities behind constitutional visions that gave new
30. See PETERSON, supra note 21.
3 1. See Whittington, supra note 25, at 589-93 (discussing as examples the Cleveland Democrats
and the Populists in the 1890s and the Democrats and the Dixiecrats in the 1940s and 1950s). The
Jacksonians themselves faced this difficulty, though the ideological parts eventually meshed reasonably
well. Opposition to protectionist tariffs only became Jacksonian orthodoxy after the demands of South-
em nullifiers were integrated into the platform in 1833. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 2, at 93-106.
32. Whittington, supra note 25, at 589-93.
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direction to American politics, guiding the actions of politicians as well as
judges. 33 Disagreements even within those coalitions could be momentarily
submerged beneath the greater desire to repudiate the commitments of the
old political majority, whether those of the Federalists of the 1790s, the
National Republicans of the 1820s, the slavery protecting Democrats of the
1850s, or the laissez-faire Republicans of the early twentieth century.
Kramer points to two of those leaders-Lincoln and FDR-to bolster his
case for the continued vitality of party-based popular constitutionalism
across the intervening decades from the invention of Van Buren's Democ-
ratic Party to the advent of the Warren Court. But they were exceptional
leaders.
Others have tried to claim the mantle of reconstructive leader, and as
part of that effort have rejected the authority of the courts to ultimately
determine constitutional meaning. Their claims were rejected. Theodore
Roosevelt's Bull Moose campaign picked up radical Progressive critiques
of judicial supremacy, but Roosevelt was defeated in 1912.34 He was un-
able to win either the White House or the Republican Party organization.
Kramer argues that the judicial supremacy issue was "contested" and that
"the years between Reconstruction and the New Deal" were "a kind of
golden age for popular constitutionalism," and he quotes the 1912 Progres-
sive Party Platform in support of that proposition. 35 Kramer broadly asserts
that "popular constitutionalism was the clear victor each time matters came
to a head," but he notes only that "the judiciary survived the Progressive
onslaught largely undamaged" in the early twentieth century. 36 Curious
readers will have to look elsewhere to learn that it was the forceful advo-
cates of judicial supremacy who won the electoral and legislative victories
between Reconstruction and the New Deal, soundly beating such apparent
standard bearers of popular constitutionalism as William Jennings Bryan,
Theodore Roosevelt, and Robert La Follette. 37 It was conservative politi-
cians like former president Benjamin Harrison, who viewed Bryan and his
populist critique of the courts as an unbridled "assault upon our constitu-
tional form of government," who carried the day. 38 For the leaders of the
victorious political coalitions during these decades, such as Calvin Coo-
33. See Keith E. Whittington, Presidential Challenges to Judicial Supremacy and the Politics of
Constitutional Meaning, 33 POLITY 365 (2001); WHITTINGTON, supra note 17.
34. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY 130-54 (1994).
35. KRAMER, supra note 3, at 215.
36. Id. at 207, 216.
37. See Keith E. Whittington, Preserving the "Dignity and Influence of the Court": Political
Supports for Judicial Review in the United States, in THE ART OF THE STATE (forthcoming May 2006).
38. DONALD GRIER STEPHENSON JR., CAMPAIGNS AND THE COURT 127 (1 999).
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lidge, our "most precious rights" were best entrusted to courts, not legisla-
tive or popular majorities. 39 The courts were "undamaged" despite Populist
and Progressive onslaughts precisely because the advocates of judicial
supremacy were the ones winning national elections.
Successful political leaders have generally had reason to be supportive
of judicial supremacy. Often it was their allies who were on the bench.
Reconstructive leaders, who were able to occupy the corridors of power on
behalf of causes and constituencies that had previously been excluded from
them, could look at the Supreme Court and recognize its hostility to their
constitutional and policy agenda. Other presidents could reasonably view
the Court with more affection. 40 The electoral and legislative arenas have
often looked less secure. Although the Jacksonians and Whigs could agree
among themselves on constitutional issues involving federal economic
policies such as the national bank and internal improvements, the increas-
ingly salient issue of slavery drove a wedge through the established parties.
While fire-eaters in the South and North could safely call for political ac-
tion on the issue, those who hoped to lead national political coalitions were,
like President James Buchanan, desperate "to suppress this agitation" by
rendering it "a judicial question."4 1 As the United States struggled through
the process of industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, divided government and ideological fragmentation were routine
features of American politics. 4 2 Unable to consolidate their hold over the
legislative agenda in that fractious environment, conservatives empowered
the courts to supervise legislative and administrative policy on econom-
ics. 43 Although the success of the New Deal reclaimed political supremacy
over economic policy and related matters such as the labor issue, the post-
New Deal parties were less comfortable taking responsibility for a host of
new constitutional issues. New Deal architects of the Court-packing plan
such as Attorney General Robert Jackson and constitutional scholar Ed-
39. CALVIN COOLIDGE, FOUNDATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC 95 (1926).
40. See Keith E. Whittington, Legislative Sanctions and the Strategic Environment of Judicial
Review, I INT'L J. CONST. LAW 446 (2003).
41. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1857), in 10 THE WORKS OF JAMES BUCHANAN
105, 106-09 (John Bassett Moore ed., Antiquarian Press 1960) (1908-1911); see also DON E.
FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 11-235
(1978); Mark A. Graber, The Non-Majoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 46-50 (1993); Wallace Mendelson, Dred Scott's Case-Reconsidered, 38
MINN. L. REV. 16 (1954); WHITTINGTON, supra note 17.
42. See Charles H. Stewart I11, Lessons from the Post-Civil War Era, in THE POLITICS OF DIVIDED
GOVERNMENT 203 (Gary W. Cox & Samuel Kemell eds., 1991); JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF
THE PARTY SYSTEM 106-69 (rev. ed. 1983).
43. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their
Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. S1. REV. 511 (2002); GEORGE
I. LOVELL, LEGISLATIVE DEFERRALS (2003).
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ward Corwin began to identify a new constitutional agenda, focusing on
freedoms that they regarded as more fundamental than property rights, that
would justify the "enlargement of judicial review" as soon as the Court had
made its switch in time.44 Unable to cope with the pressures of the race
issue at mid-century, Democratic and Republican presidents and presiden-
tial candidates alike sought refuge behind the shield of judicial supremacy
and hoped that "the action of the Court ... would remove this issue from
the political arena .... ,"45 Unwilling to take the responsibility for vetoing
popular legislation that included provisions that offended their constitu-
tional sensibilities, contemporary presidents such as Bill Clinton and
George W. Bush have preferred to pass the buck to a Supreme Court that
might be more willing and able to withstand the political heat.46
CONCLUSION
The People Themselves sets up a sharp opposition between popular
constitutionalism and judicial supremacy. It is often unclear who exactly
the judicial supremacists are in this story and how, if at all, they might ever
get the upper hand. By contrast, the standard bearers of popular constitu-
tionalism are often clear enough in Kramer's account, and they include
such political leaders as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham
Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt. History is replete, however, with political
leaders who advocate judicial supremacy and deference to the constitu-
tional wisdom of the courts. Most of the time, presidents and party leaders
have ample reason to seek to entrust their constitutional aspirations to the
judges and to offer political support for judicial supremacy. The Constitu-
tion outside the courts often makes its way into the courts, as judges are
incorporated into the political process of articulating new constitutional
meaning and enforcing old constitutional understanding. Politicians some-
times want to take a leadership role in interpreting the Constitution, but
more often they are happy to cede responsibility for resolving controversial
constitutional questions and instead to defer to the leadership of the judges.
Proposals to prune or uproot judicial supremacy require that we first grap-
44. EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 111-12 (1941). Others on the left
had similarly embraced courts as an alternative to popular constitutionalism by the time of the New
Deal. See Emily Zackin, Popular Constitutionalism's Hard When You're Not Very Popular: Why the
ACLU Turned to Courts (2005) (unpublished paper, on file with author).
45. JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN, ADLAI STEVENSON AND THE WORLD 266 (1977) (quoting Adlai
Stevenson).
46. See, e.g., Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with the American Society of News-
paper Editors in Dallas, Texas, I PUB. PAPERS 474, 485 (Apr. 7, 1995) (statement by President William
J. Clinton); Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 1 PUB. PAPERS 503
(Mar. 27, 2002) (statement by President George W. Bush).
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ple with the reasons why it has been such a persistent feature of the Ameri-
can political landscape. The justices have not hoodwinked the people and
its representatives into accepting judicial supremacy. Judicial supremacy is
a construction of the people's representatives and has more often than not
been embraced by the people themselves.
